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1. Introduction
This paper considers the outcomes when a business project, using 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) as a method of supplying public services 
(including social infrastructure), faces bankruptcy and the financial 
institution or government considers purchase price, externalities, and risk 
of the respective facilities as the causes for businesses to either continue 
or collapse. At the same time, it clarifies that price is a mechanism 
that induces business failure. The results of this study have a certain 
suggestion, especially when considering possibility of further PFI business 
failures, such as Taraso Fukuoka—Japan’s first PFI business failure.
Japan employs many privatization methods, a prime example of which 
is the PFI that originated in the United Kingdom. More specifically, PFI 
is a method that provides public services using private sector funds and 
the management techniques of business operators. Features of this method 
include the following expectations: (1) lower cost, (2) increased quality, 
and (3) appropriate distribution of risk between the public and private 
sectors compared with the public utility being supplied as direct public 
services from the government.1
However, there are also projects that have been inappropriately 
managed. For example, the financial institution that was expected to 
undertake the funding and supervising role for Taraso Fukuoka (initiated 
by Fukuoka City) conferred a secured loan with effectively equated to a 
1 Refer to Noda (2003).
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“Retention of Assets by Contractor on Terminate Clause（RACTC）.” 
RACTC stipulates that the government, which initiates the project, will 
purchase the remaining facilities if the project is suspended.2 In this case, 
the monitoring of the business by the financial institution did not succeed. 
As a result, the company went bankrupt after three years.
Previous research has noted that there is no certainty regarding the 
success of a business project when a long-term contract is created using 
the PFI method. For this reason, progress has been made in applied 
research based on Hart’s (1995) Incomplete Contract Theory, as seen in 
studies by Bennett and Iossa (2006), Oshima (2001), Miura (2008), Mitsui 
(2003), and Onishi, Seki, and Kobayashi (2005). Upon closer examination, 
Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Oshima (2001) conducted comparative 
verifications of social welfare by considering the public works method and 
the PFI method as the respective business methods. Mitsui (2003) noted 
that additional burden would be placed on the private sector business 
operator if the possibility of a project being canceled before expiration 
is introduced, thus resulting in new inefficiencies with a reduction in 
the number of tender participants. Based on the assumption that a 
financial institution can determine a subsequent revitalization scheme if a 
project fails, Miura (2008) analyzed the effect on social welfare from an 
investment efficiency perspective. Conversely, from a financial perspective, 
Onishi, Seki, and Kobayashi (2005) considered corporate revitalization and 
liquidation in light of subsidy policies and pre-contract guarantees while 
considering the externalities for a project confronted with a liquidity 
shock.
Although successive prior research has analyzed the bankruptcies 
of projects, consideration was not made regarding the RACTC induces 
2 Refer to Ooshima (2007).
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such bankruptcies. In practice, there are also projects that enjoy societal 
expectations of having their lives extended through additional funding 
from financial institutions that are conscious of externalities, even if the 
business fails once. However, some projects that rely on an assessment of 
the risk and RACTC are quickly terminated, which results in a loss for 
the society. Therefore, this study provides a certain degree of significance 
by clarifying the relationship between the RACTC and additional funding 
from two different perspectives: 1) the financial institution that decides 
whether to extend additional funding to a company once it has failed, and 2) 
the government that wants to maximize social welfare.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a basic 
model while Section 3 analyzes the impact on the RACTC, risk, and social 
welfare. Section 4 presents an example of a failed Japanese business 
together with the policy implications. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the 
results.
2 Model
This study presents a model based on Holmström and Tirole (1998) 
and Onishi, Seki, and Kobayashi (2005).The model is set out as follows. 
We consider a situation in which the government uses a PFI to supply a 
public service. Fig.1 considers a multi-period model from Date 1 to Date 
3. In this model, there are three players, i.e., the government, the Special 
Purpose Company (SPC), and the financial institution. We consider all 
the players to be risk neutral and set the discount rate and interest rate 
at zero. There is only one of each type of entity and there are individual 
contracts between single players. Although there are multiple financial 
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institutions, competition means that it is synonymous as one party.3 We 
assume that the financial institution can raise an unlimited amount of funds 
from the capital markets at a zero interest rate.
Fig.1 Timeline
(Source: created by the author)
At Date 1, the government presents the SPC with a PFI business 
contract. The government is charitable and aims to accumulate the net 
benefits that also include the SPC, the financial institution, and the public 
to maximize the social welfare. If the SPC rejects the business contract, 
then this reservation utility for the player ceases. Conversely, if the 
business contract is signed, then the government and the SPC specify 
the design and operating costs of the project as well as the actions to be 
taken if the contract is dissolved due to business failure. For simplicity, 
we assume that the SPC does not have any of its own capital.4 In this 
case, the SPC must enter into a loan contract with the financial institution 
on Date 1 and procure Initial Investment 1. The loan contract specifies 
3 Refer to Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) regarding where a financial 
institution has limited funds and there are multiple financial institutions.
4 In practice, the SPC raises various funds from general contractors, banks, 
securities companies, and corporate bonds. External funds have a major 
impact on an SPC’s behavior. That is, there is “discipline imposed by debt” 
from corporate finance. Conversely, since this study aims to analyze the 
price of RACTC, we have excluded the problem of discipline imposed on the 
SPC by the various funding methods and debt from this analysis.
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Loan Amount 1 and Repayment Amount D. The SPC then launch the 
project after entering into the business contract. If successful with the 
first loan, the SPC receives Service Transfer Fee R from the government 
(for the value of the project based on the business contract document) and 
subsequently provides the financial institution with Repayment Amount D.
If the project fails with the first funding and the SPC faces an 
unanticipated “liquidity shock”5 caused by the lack of funds on Date 2,then 
the government faces a business failure. If the risk of business failure due 
to the failure with the first funding increases and there is a temporary 
lack of funds, the SPC that does not hold assets shall borrow x as 
additional funding from the financial institution. Moreover, a decision must 
be made whether the project must once again borrow additional funding 
(long-term: life extension)or liquidate (short-term: quick termination). The 
magnitude of the additional funding is x∈[0, xー], x≥0. If additional fundingis 
not obtained,then the project ceases, the SPC is liquidated,and the 
government (as the lender) pays the “Retention of Assets by Contractor 
on Terminate Price（RACTP）”to the financial institution.The RACTP 
is the value to be paid by the government to the financial institution to 
purchase the remaining facilities if the SPC continues to execute the 
project till the expiry of the contract or if it fails before the contract 
5 In recent years, there have been many cases worldwide where projects, 
business operators, financial institutions, and governments have suffered 
liquidity shocks due to a temporary lack of funding and have, thus, faced 
bankruptcy. Previously, there was limited academic debate concerning 
this problem. However, Allen, Carletti, Krahnen, and Tyrell (2011) and 
Holmström and Tirole (2011) have undertaken a systematic discussion of 
credit supply in the public sector, and the response to financial crises, 
currency, liquidity, and asset prices. The case of the PFI business failure 
presented in Section 4 is a typical example of a project failing through a 
liquidity shock. 
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expires. That is, this condition equates to a “government guarantee”and 
effectively functions as a security. Furthermore, the source of funding for 
the facility purchase price has a social cost of λ≥0 (as an excess tax burden 
indicated in Laffont and Tirole(1987)), which results in a burden of 1+λ, 
1>λ≥0 for each unit of tax levy.
When there is additional funding once a project fails, the SPC 
progresses to Date 3 with β probability of success, resulting in the expected 
benefit of R+Rt+Bt and Et.R is the service transfer fee paid by the 
government when the project is successful through either the first funding 
or through additional funding after failing once. Rt is the additional service 
transfer fee paid by the government when the project faces liquidity 
constraints after failing once,but then succeeds with additional funding. Bt 
is the private benefit6 of the SPC for the project’s success of receiving 
additional funding after failing once. Furthermore, PFI businesses include 
many operations that are highly public in nature and Et is assumed to 
represent the corresponding business sector externalities for the entire 
society. Although project areas are wide-ranging, externalities are 
assumed to have a constant value for all Et. Regarding expediency, the 
expected benefit Et is assumed to belong to citizens. Furthermore, the 
expected benefit evaluated at the beginning of Date 1 is assumed to have 
a non-negative value. Conversely, the financial institution will derive 
RACTP CG from the government if the project fails with a probability of 
1－β.
As noted in Miura (2008), we assume that the SPC will transfer 
6 Private benefit Bt is a non-monetary benefit that can only be gained by 
an SPC that cannot establish proof. For example, it is the evaluation of 
a project that fails with the first funding and succeeds with additional 
funding. Such a track record is considered at the time of the tender for the 
subsequent PFI transaction. 
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 x∈[0, xー], x≥0.
the business operations to the financial institution for projects that are 
given an extension of life through the provision of additional funding 
by financial institution. Therefore, in the case of a project failing once 
but subsequently succeeding,the financial institution shall gain R+Rt, 
which includes additional benefits,in which case the SPC will only gain 
private benefit Bt. All aspects will be realized and end at Date 3,and the 
government shall pay either service transfer fee R+Rt or RACTP CG to 
the financial institution.7 
If the project succeeds with the first funding, the SPC’s monetary 
benefits on Date 2 shall be the expected benefit R−D, which can be proven 
by deducting repayment amount D from service transfer fee R. 
From the above, the timing (in order of the contract) shall be as 
follows:
Timing
Date 1
1.  The government and the SPC execute a business contract. There will be 
a reservation utility if not executed.
2.  The SPC requests a loan contract for initial investment 1 from the 
financial institution. This ends if there is no loan.
3.  If successful with the first funding,the benefit to the SPC is R−D, and 
the benefit to the financial institutionis D－1. 
7 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) analyzed the decision-making process 
regarding whether to extend funding in accordance with the profitability of a 
project in centralized and decentralized markets. Conversely, this paper treats 
the failure of a project as being identical to transferring business operations 
to the financial institution. Furthermore, one feature of this paper is to clarify 
the externalities and the risk not evaluated by the financial institution that 
has been secured by the facility purchase clause provided by the government, 
even if the project fails after the first or second additional funding.
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Date 2
1.  If the first funding results in failure, the SPC requests additional 
funding from the financial institution.
2.  If additional fundingis not received, the financial institution gains CG－1. 
3.  If there is additional funding and success with probabilityβ, the benefit 
to the SPC is Bt, and the benefit to the financial institution is R+Rt－
(1+x),while the benefit to citizens is Et. If failing with a probability1－
β,the expected benefit of the SPC and citizens is 0, while the benefit to 
the financial institution is CG－(1+ x).  
Date 3
1.  Every aspect is realized. 
The ultimate expected net benefit is summarized in Fig.2.
 
Fig.2 Expected net benefit tree
(Source: created by the author)
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Based on Fig.2 and from the perspective that the expected benefit to 
society as a whole evaluated at the beginning of Date 1 is not a negative 
value,the following equationis derived:
 R+max[Rt+Bt+Et,CG]－1－E(x)≥0  (1)
E(x) represents the expected value of the probability variable x due to the 
risk of additional cost,with E(x)≥0. Furthermore, the condition in which 
there is social utility in continuing the project rather than liquidating it at 
Date 2 can be expressed as follows:
 β(Rt+Bt+Et)+(1－β)CG－x≥0  (2)
Under the basic model, from the social welfare perspective, it is always 
effective for a project to continue with additional funding with the given 
probability. Thus, from Equation (1),it can be assumed that the following 
equation will hold true:
 R+max[Rt+Bt+Et,CG]≥ x
ー  (3)
In contrast, if the amount of additional funding necessary for the 
continuation of a project(that has failed with the first funding and has 
continued to suffer a liquidity shock)is large, then the following equation 
holds true:
 R+β(Rt+Et+Bt)+(1－β)CG< x
ー (4)
However, ignoring external impacts at Date 2,the additional funding is 
quite large for a financial institution that has failed with the first funding. 
That is, if there are larger expected benefits from quick termination with 
the first funding rather than prolonging the life,then the following equation 
must be true:
 βRt+(1－β)CG< x
ー (5)
Furthermore, the financial institution will only agree to additional funding 
if it is able to recover part of the initial investment. Thus, the following 
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equation represents the conditionality of additional funding:
 x≤R+max[Rt,CG](=x*) (6)
If x>R+max [Rt,CG], then there will be no additional funding. Therefore, 
the assumptions from Equations (3) and (5) mean that if the x needed for 
additional funding after a project fails from the first funding falls within 
the range of (x*,xー], then there will be inefficiencies with the selection of 
a short-term project and quick termination even if a long-term project is 
efficient from a social welfare perspective.
3 RACTC, Risk, and Social Welfare
3.1 RACTC
This section clarifies the economic utility of the RACTP paid by the 
government to the financial institution if the business fails. If βRt+(1－
β)CG－x≥CG for the financial institution, then the expected benefit of 
extending additional funding would be larger than the RACTP paid by 
the government to the financial institution, especially if the project was 
liquidated after the first funding. Therefore,
 Rt－ xβ ≥CG (7)
Proposition 1.
The increase (decrease) in the expected net benefit, if there is additional 
funding, and the decrease (increase) in additional cost and the RACTP  provides 
the incentive for the financial institution to select a long- (short-) term project.
Based on Proposition 1, if the expected net benefit of additional 
funding for a long-term project that has failed once is larger than the 
RACTP if the project is liquidated without additional funding, then 
the long-term project would be the equilibrium path. In other words, 
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the financial institution has the incentive to extend additional funding if 
Equation (7) holds true.
Furthermore, if Equation (2) holds true(=Rt+Et+Bt－ xβ ≥CG), then the 
government would enjoy more social welfare from the long-term project 
than from the short-term project, similar to the financial institution. 
Therefore, a government hoping to maximize social welfare would execute 
a contract that reduces the RACTP purchase price so that the life of the 
project would be extended.
However, the welfare of both the financial institution and the 
government differs from the valuation of the externalities and the private 
benefit of the SPC (Et+Bt). The decision regarding additional funding 
based only on the utility of the financial institution does not consider the 
externalities and the private benefit of the SPC, thus leading to Equation 
(7). If the government wants to extend the life of the project, it can reduce 
the RACTP purchase price, reduce the additional funding,or increase the 
expected net benefit from success.
Let us now consider the case in which the business fails from a 
liquidity shock on Date 2. Specifically, the government sets a RACTP 
with the external effect as the upper limit to prevent inefficient liquidation. 
If the liquidity shock conforms to 0<x≤R+Rt, the financial institution will 
extend additional funding even without the provision of a RACTC from 
the government. Conversely, if the liquidity shock conforms to R+Rt<x≤
xー, then the SPC will be unable to obtain additional funding, unless the 
government confers a RACTC. Thus, if the government sets a minimum 
RACTP[x－(R+Rt)＝0] so that the SPC’s expected benefit is zero, then the 
project will continue with additional funding. The social welfare at Date 1, 
if such a clause is provided, can be represented by:
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If a long-term project obtains additional funding and achieves success, 
then the social welfare can be derived using the following formula: 
In other words, social welfare on Date 1 becomes:
(8)
Proposition 2.
Setting a RACTC to avoid inefficient liquidation results in a non-negative value 
for social welfare of the long-term project in accordance with Equation (1).
There is also an excess tax burden when providing a RACTC, which 
is represented as follows:
Furthermore, social welfare allowing for such an excess tax burden is 
represented as follows:
(9)
Equation (9) indicates the respective additional service transfer fee, 
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the external effect, the private benefit, the excess tax burden, and the 
RACTP of a project whose life is extended, even if the project fails with 
the first funding. If the excess burden is small in Equation (9), then the 
government can increase the social welfare by introducing a RACTC.
Moreover, the government can control the RACTP, making it possible 
to quickly terminate or extend the life of the operating period. At the 
same time, the government can avoid inefficient liquidation by manipulating 
this price. However, the requirement for resources results in an excess 
tax burden. In contrast, Equation (8) indicates that there is a difference 
between social welfare and the expected benefit of the financial institution. 
For this reason, there is a distortion in the external effect and the private 
benefit (even if the life is extended, as in Equation (2)). As a result, 
the project will not even reach first best. Furthermore, in some cases, 
the external effect from extending the life of the business through the 
introduction of a RACTP will increase social welfare.
3.2 Risk
This section considers the risk of externalities which results in 
distortion and prevents the project from reaching first best.Furthermore, 
it examines the expansion of the basic model and the uncertain external 
effect (Et) indicated by the probability variable. The external effect is 
confirmed on Date 2 as E
—t with probabilityβ, and 0 with probability1－β. 
We assume a definite value for the service transfer ascertained from the 
first and additional funding. 
The model considers the case of a substantial liquidity shock that 
complies with Equation (5). If the assumptions for Equation (2) are eased 
and the external effect is small, then there could be a situation with 
a liquidity shock, meaning that the continuation of the project is not 
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necessarily efficient in terms of social welfare. That is, it would be more 
effective to extend the life of the project from a social perspective in the 
case that the liquidity shock x conforms to x∈[0, R+Rt+Et]. However, it 
would be more effective to liquidate the project from a social perspective 
where x∈[R+Rt+Et , xー].
The model takes C^G to be the RACTP at which the project fails 
with the intial investment on Date 1 with a probability (1－β) of failing 
again after receiving additional funding on Date 2, where 0≤C
^
G≤E
—t. 
Furthermore, the external effect on Date 2 is defined as Et=E
—t. At this 
time, it would be more efficient from a social welfare perspective for the 
government to extend the life of the project, if x≤R+Rt+E
—t. Conversely, 
if x>R+Rt+E
—t, it would be more efficient for the government to quickly 
terminate the project. However, if the liquidity shock is within the realm 
of x∈(R+Rt+C
^
G,R+Rt+E
—t), the project should be terminated quickly, even if 
it is efficient to extend the life of the project.8 Here, the social loss from 
quick termination can be represented as follows:
If the external effect is defined as Et=0, it would be more efficient for 
the government to extend the life of the project, if x≤R+Rt. In contrast, 
if x>R+Rt, then it would be more efficient for the government to quickly 
terminate the project. Therefore, if the liquidity shock conforms with x∈
(R+Rt,R+Rt+C^G), then the life of the project will be extended, even if it is 
more efficient to quickly terminate the project. Here, the social loss from 
8 If  C^G>E
—t , Et=E
—t, there would be a social loss from the inefficient extension 
of the life of the project in a similar way to when the liquidity shock 
conforms with  x∈(R+Rt+E
—t,R+Rt+C
^
G) . The results of this analysis essentially 
have the same meaning as the case of 0≤C
^
G≤E
—t raised in Section 3.2.
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the inefficient continuation of the project can be represented as follows: 
In other words, the social loss, assuming the RACTP set at C^G , is as 
follows:
 (10)
The problem of setting the optimal RACTP price can be formularized 
(based on Equation (10)) as follows:
The optimal condition for this problem is
 (11)
Furthermore, the RACTP CG* that minimizes the expected social cost due 
to the inefficient quick termination or life extension in accordance with 
Equation (11) is
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Furthermore, the expected social cost to be realized when CG*  is as follows:
(13)
Proposition 3.
Depending on the amounts set for the RACTP and the external effect, there can be 
inefficiencies even with additional funding. The optimal value is when the RACTP 
equals the external effect.
Equation (10) indicates that unconditionally conferring a RACTC (due 
to the risk from Proposition 3) does not necessarily result in the optimum 
position for social welfare due to the social loss. That is, the social 
welfare is maximized when the RACTP and the expected value of the 
external effect are the same, as shown in Equation (12).
However, if there is no RACTC, the expected social loss can be 
represented by
Furthermore, the effect of introducing a RACTC Φ（R+Rt,R+Rt+CG*） leads 
to:
(14)
When the external effect from Equation (14) is large, the RACTP 
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has the effect of increasing the social welfare by avoiding inefficient quick 
termination. However, when the external effect is small, the RACTP 
fosters inefficient life extension and reduces social welfare.
3.3 Social Welfare
This section considers whether it is desirable to have either the PFI 
method or the public utility from a social welfare perspective. The social 
welfare from the public utility is defined as 
 (15)
This section considers three cases of social welfare under the 
PFI method. The first is social welfare that incorporates the RACTC 
attributed to the distortion in the external effect and the tax for a given 
probability of additional funding, even if the project fails with the first 
funding. This is defined as9 
 (16)
The second is social welfare in which project life is extended, even 
though there is the risk of additional cost  x∈(Rt,Rt+C
^
G) , and is more efficient 
to terminate quickly. This is defined as follows:
9 The RACTP and the remaining assets are considered to be the same under 
Equation (16), if the project fails after the first funding. Therefore, if there 
is a probability 1-β of failure with additional funding, then there will be 
distortion -λCG in the tax resources to pay the financial institution the 
RACTP. The same is applicable for Equations (17) and (18).
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The third is social welfare in which the project is quickly terminated, 
even though  x∈(Rt+C
^
G,Rt+E
—t)  and project life extension is efficient. This 
is defined as: 
(18)
Let us now perform a comparison of the social welfare for the 
respective cases. The problem for the government of whether the business 
should fail or continue, due to a liquidity shock on Date 2, is considered by 
using Equation (16) for the PFI method and Equation (15) for the public 
utility. Whether to extend additional funding is based on the following: 
However, it is important to note the difference in the evaluation of 
the government, which hopes to maximize social welfare that incorporates 
the externalities and the excess tax burden (as in Case 1), whereas the 
financial institution does not consider this.
This section considers Equation (17), which is the PFI method 
incorporating risk, and Equation (15), which is the public utility. That 
is, x∈(Rt,Rt+C
^
G) , where the life of the project is extended, even though 
liquidation is efficient. In this case, social welfare is represented by
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In Case 2, quick termination without additional funding can increase 
social welfare. However, since a RACTC is conferred, the expected 
benefit to the financial institution is increased by extending the life of the 
project. Thus, the financial institution will extend additional funding, which 
suggests a possibility of the PFI method being deployed with an extension 
of the project. However, it would be more beneficial from a social welfare 
perspective to use the public utility. However, when a RACTP is granted, 
the PFI method is not necessarily the most desirable, at least from a 
social perspective.
Similarly, this paper considers additional cost being  x∈(Rt+C^G,Rt+E
—t) . 
In this case, the project will be liquidated even though it is efficient to 
extend the life of the project. Therefore, using Equations (15) and (18) 
results in social welfare, as represented by
Under Case 3, it is better for social welfare to extend the life of 
the project. However, rather than a PFI method, the structure will be 
the public utility. The reason being that the financial institution has 
the incentive to utilize the RACTC and quickly terminate the project, 
especially in the case of a PFI business that includes substantial risk 
for externalities and the RACTP. This suggests that when the range 
of additional cost is within x∈(Rt+C^G,Rt+E
—t) , the project can be quickly 
terminated, even though it is desirable from a social perspective to extend 
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the life of the project.
Proposition 4.
Where there are large risks in the PFI method, this method will not necessarily 
increase the social welfare. Furthermore, since there is a difference between the 
expected benefit for the financial institution and social welfare, there could also 
be cases in which quick termination or life extension are not desirable, at least 
from a social welfare perspective.
This can be confirmed with numerical examples. For example, the 
Gauss–Legendre quadrature, a numerical integration algorithm, can be 
used to derive an approximation of the integral from Cases1 to 3. The 
specific values are assumed to be  Rt＝1, Et＝0.2, x=0.3, λ=0.1,and β=0.5,  
and when they are transposed into the left-hand side of Equation (7), the 
result is CG=0.4. 
An approximation by transposing each value into the right-hand side 
inequality of Case 1 results in the government10 valuation of 0.174<0.3 and 
a tax distortion. Meanwhile, the financial institution, which does not need to 
consider the remaining facilities, has a valuation of 0.31>0.3. In Case 2, the 
government’s valuation is 0.232<0.3, while the financial institution’s valuation 
is 0.28<0.3. In Case 3, the government’s valuation is 0.116<0.3,while the 
financial institution’s valuation is －0.28<0.3. The results of the theoretical 
analysis and the numerical calculations are consistent for Cases1 and 2. 
However, due to the high valuation of the facility purchase price and the 
low valuation of the externalities, they differ for Case 3.
10 The government will decide whether to extend the life of the project from 
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Based on the above mentioned findings, it is clear that the government 
and the financial institution have different interpretations, depending 
on the valuation of the externalities and the RACTP, as in Case 1. In 
particular, it is interesting to note that if there is a large valuation of 
the RACTP (even after failing twice), the financial institution has the 
incentive to use the PFI method and extend the life of the project. Where 
there is low evaluation of externalities, as in Cases 2 and 3, the public 
utility is adopted. In other words, there is a tendency for the RACTP 
to be an incentive for quick termination of the project. Similar results 
are ascertained using other numerical integration algorithms such as the 
trapezoidal rule, Simpson’s rule, and the midpoint rule.
4 Case Study
This section provides a comparative verification of the theoretical 
consequences of Section 3 and the example of Taraso Fukuoka, Japan’s 
PFI business failure. This particular business was selected due to the 
definitive effect of the RACTC compared with other examples of business 
failures.11
Taraso Fukuoka was a business that operated and maintained Taraso 
Therapy, which used warm seawater, exercise facilities, and facilities to 
promote regional community interaction and efficiently use thermal energy 
created from waste processed at the Fukuoka City waste disposal facility 
(Fukuoka City Seaside Facility). The main details of its operations are 
presented in Table 1.
11 For example, “Maintenanceand operations of HibikiContainer Terminal in Kita 
Kyushu, Fukuoka Prefecture,” “Operation of new hospital in Kochi City, Kochi 
Prefecture,” and “Operation of Shiritsusogo Medical Center,Omihachiman, 
Shiga Prefecture.” 
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Sponsor FukuokaCity
Businessname FukuokaCitySeasideFacility
Typeoffacility Utilizes residual heat fromwaste factories as an energy
source.
ScopeofPFIoperations Design, construction, andmaintenance of facilities using
residual heat. Land provided for free,with free supply of
electricity.
Projectmethod BOT
Businessstructure Mixed: servicevalue (outsource fee (commission))+usage
revenue
Termofbusiness 15years
Contractamount 1,190,000,000yen
Table 1 Taraso Fukuoka Contract Details
(Source: compiled from Ooshima (2007) and the Cabinet Office PFI Promotion Office 
website <http://www8.cao.go.jp/pfi/>, accessed September 21, 2011).
The history of Taraso Fukuoka’s business is presented in Table 2. 
After commencing operations in April 2002, the business deteriorated 
with sluggish user numbers in its first year, leading to the closure of 
the facilities and collapse of the former SPC (Taraso Fukuoka KK) in 
November 2004. The facilities subsequently reopened after a four-month 
break in April 2005 under a new SPC (Fukuoka Seaside PFI KK).
April2002 CommencedtheuseofTarasoFukuokaFacilities
July2003 Facilitiesrenewed
January2004 Financialcrisis report fromtheTarasoFukuokaCouncil (City,Taraso
FukuokaKK)
March2004 OhkiCo., the representativecompany forTarasoFukuokaKKfiles for
civilrehabilitationprocedures.
September2004 TheBoard ofDirectors of TarasoFukuokaKKdecides to file for
statutorybankruptcyprocedures.
November2004 TarasoFukuokafacilitiesclose.However,thecommunityzonecontinues
operations.
February2005 Facilities transferred fromthe formerSPCTarasoFukuokaKK to the
newSPCFukuokaSeasidePFIKK.
April2005 Newopening(operationsresume)
Table 2 History of Taraso Fukuoka’s collapse and revival
(Source: same as Table 1).
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A reason for the collapse of the business was the existence of the 
RACTC. Inclusion of such a clause meant that the financial institution only 
invested to the “extent that it could recover the investment from Fukuoka 
City through the RACTP.” As a result, a project financing scheme was 
used to recover the amount of the loan from the business profits. However, 
the expected role of the financial institution to monitor the business and 
enforce management discipline did not work.12 The main reason being that 
the RACTC only functioned as a type of security.
This clause was originally a method for a government to purchase the 
remaining facilities and provide an extended period of service when the 
provision of such service is required following termination. This was in 
accordance with the end of a contract that used a PFI method aimed at 
reducing costs, improving quality, and distributing risk to the public when 
there was a certain level of requirement from the local public for public 
service. However, in reality, this clause became a requirement in the 
name of service continuity. For this reason, the financial institution only 
provided loans up to the amount of the RACTP. The result was that the 
loan was risk-free to the financial institution. Furthermore, the project 
monitoring function and prompt corrective action (for deteriorating 
finances and eventual bankruptcy from the financial institution) were 
completely absent.
From a theoretical perspective, this is consistent with Proposition 
1. More specifically, the entire loan amount to Taraso Fukuoka was 
guaranteed and the management deteriorated from the beginning, thus 
requiring additional costs. Under such circumstances, the financial 
institution had the incentive to quickly terminate the project rather than 
improve the business by extending its life.
12 Refer to the Fukuoka City PFI Promotion Committee, 2005. 
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Under Proposition 2, if a long-term project is desirable from a social 
welfare perspective, but the large additional cost and either one or both 
of the additional expected benefit and externalities are highly valued, 
then conferring a facility purchase clause is also considered desirable to 
avoid a short-term project. However, there were large additional costs for 
the Taraso Fukuoka operations with virtually no externalities evident. If 
the features of the business are considered, there would be no need for 
a facility purchase clause. At the very least, this clause should not have 
been mandatory, but nothing more than a so-called right.
Proposition 3 implies that an unconditional RACTP is undesirable 
in terms of social welfare. More specifically, when the price is the same 
amount as the external effect, it conforms to the optimal condition. In 
Taraso Fukuoka’s business, the financial institution considered the 
profitability of the project and not the risk of externalities. Thus, it 
merely decided to liquidate by exercising its right to the RACTP since 
the expected benefit was larger than what would have been obtained by 
extending the life of the project. If the evaluation criteria for this price 
had set an amount that was the same as the social value of the project, 
including externalities rather than the value of the remaining facilities 
at the time of business failure or end of the contract, then moral hazard 
would not have been created for the financial institution. Moreover, there 
may not have been such an inefficient quick termination or liquidation. 
Finally, Proposition 4 cannot prove that the PFI method will 
necessarily be better than the public utility in accordance with the 
additional cost, risk, RACTP, and the external effect. In the case of 
Taraso Fukuoka, a better approach would have been to not provide 
additional funding and quickly terminate the project under the public 
utility, as in Case 2. However, the provision of a RACTP meant that the 
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PFI method, which can lead to an extension of the life of the project, was 
used. In sum, the public utility with quick termination would have been 
better for Taraso Fukuoka.
5 Conclusion
This paper conducted a theoretical analysis of the relationship 
between the effect of RACTC and additional funding for a PFI business 
that had failed once. There are four points in the overall argument. First, 
the increase (decrease) in the expected net benefit and the decrease 
(increase) in the additional funding and RACTP when a business has failed 
once provides the incentive for the financial institution to extend (quickly 
terminate) the life of the project. Second, depending on the additional 
costs, additional expected benefits, and externalities, there are cases in 
which conferring a RACTC is also beneficial for social welfare. Third, 
it is not beneficial in terms of social welfare to confer a RACTP for all 
businesses. Specifically, if this price is the same as the external effect, 
then it conforms to the optimal conditions. Fourth, it cannot be concluded 
that the PFI method is necessarily better than the public utility.
Based on these four theoretical conclusions, it is possible to 
determine whether there are clauses that can contribute to maximizing 
social welfare. These clauses include business details, externalities, public 
nature, additional costs if the business fails once, additional expected 
benefits, private benefits, and the setting of the facility purchase price. 
Furthermore, the results of a comparative verification of Taraso Fukuoka 
indicate that the quick termination or extension of the life of the project 
required a decision on whether the method of providing the business was 
through the PFI method or the public utility.
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